"It Was
Inevitable..."
Once the police have probable cause to search a defendant's bag, if
they fail to obtain a warrant, does the inevitable discovery doctrine
defeat a motion to suppress the contraband found therein when the police
claim that had they sought a search warrant, it would have been granted
and the contaband would have been discovered in the subsequent search?
In U.S. v. Allen, ___F.3d___ (97-4100, 4th Cir. September
28, 1998), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reminded us that the
answer is "No." The existence of probable cause for a warrant, in and of
itself, and without any evidence that the police would have acted to
obtain a warrant, does not trigger the inevitable discovery doctrine,
any more than probable cause, in and of itself, renders a warrantless
search valid. Citing numerous cases from other circuits, the Court
reiterated that the before the inevitable discovery doctrine will apply,
the government must present evidence: 1. that the police had probable
cause to obtain a warrant prior to the search but failed to do so, and
2. that the police would have obtained the necessary warrant absent the
illegal search.
"I 1B1.8 To Tell You This, But..."
If the plea agreement of a cooperating defendant provides that,
pursuant to 1B1.8, information obtained from the defendant may not be
used by the Court in determining the defendant's applicable guideline
range, may the defendant speak freely with the U.S. Probation Officer
about his relevant offense conduct? The answer is yes and no.
In U.S. v. Washington, ___F.3d___ (97-4235, 4th Cir. June 1,
1998), the defendant entered into a plea agreement which provided that
information provided by the defendant could not be used by the Court in
determining the defendant's applicable guideline range. After entering
into the agreement, the defendant made statements to the probation
officer indicating that the defendant's involvement in the conspiracy
was more wide ranging than the government had believed. At sentencing,
the defendant moved for a reduction in his offense level on the grounds
that he was a minimal or minor participant. The district court denied
the motion because of statements made by the defendant to the probation
officer. In reversing, the Fourth Circuit reiterated its belief that a
cooperating defendant must be confident that he will not be punished for
his truthfulness.
Beware though. Even the Fourth Circuit's concern will not prevent the
use of such information to deny a cooperating defendant's 5K1.1 motion
for a downward departure. The Court's opinion in U.S. v. Maluto,
946 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1991) was trumped by a 1992 amendment to 1B1.8.
See 1B1.8(b)(5).
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Trump Jury Determination
The Criminal Defense Bar learned some time ago that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines can be a cold and rigid place frought with danger.
Amongst the most frightening beasts that roam this land is the one known
as "Relevant Conduct," which often has little to do with the "offense
conduct" for which the defendant is being sentenced.
We learned some time ago that pleading to a single count does little
to save the defendant from the clutches of Relevant Conduct, and we
later saw how even acquittal on a substantive count could do nothing to
slay the beast.
In Edwards, et al. v. United States, ___U.S.___, 1998 W.L.
201395 (No. 96-8732), the United States Supreme Court reminds us once
again that the jury's role in our federal system of criminal
jurisprudence is limited to determining only guilt or innocence
regarding the offense of conviction, while the sentencing court is
concerned with all of the Relevant Conduct under � 1B1.3 U.S.S.G. While
the jury must determine issues beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentencing
judge need only be convinced of relevant conduct by a preponderance of
the evidence. Accordingly, in determining the guidelines sentence, the
sentencing court may consider drug charges for which the offender was
acquitted by the jury! Where have you gone Earl Warren...?